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INTRODUCTION

The name Nancy Suders may soon plague plaintiffs and employee
rights advocates. In granting certiorari in Suders's case of alleged sexual
harassment and constructive discharge against her supervisor and the
Pennsylvania State Police Department, the United States Supreme Court
agreed to decide whether a constructive discharge is a "tangible
employment action" under its companion opinions in Ellerth v. Burlington
Industries, Inc.,' and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,' thereby precluding
the employer from raising the affirmative defense to vicarious liability.'
This inquiry is by itself complicated due to the Court's imprecise language
regarding a "tangible employment action." 4 Additionally, the Court has yet
to address the issue, currently debated among federal courts of a plaintiff's
burden of proof in establishing that her resignation should be treated under

t Associate, Jones Day, New York, New York. L.L.M. New York Univerity (2004);
J.D., with honors, Emory University School of Law (2000); B.A., cum laude, University of
Pennsylvania (1997).
1. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
2. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
3. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003), petition for cert. granted, 72
U.S.L.W. 3105 (U.S. Dec 01, 2003) (NO. 03-95). The specific question presented by the
petitioner is: "When a hostile work environment created by a supervisor culminates in a
constructive discharge, may the employer assert the affirmative defense recognized in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)?" See 2003 WL 22428573 (U.S.).
4. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-63. This casenote will focus exclusively on the Court's
failure to ascribe a clear meaning to the term "tangible employment action" as it regards
whether a constructive discharge should be considered a "tangible employment action" for
purposes of employer liability under Ellerth and Faragher.
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Title VII as the equivalent of a formal termination and thus, a cognizable
constructive discharge. 5
Standing alone, these issues are not insurmountable. Despite the
ambiguity of the meaning of the critical phrase "tangible employment
action," the Court's Ellerth/Faragher opinions,6 which are explicitly
motivated by agency principles and Title VII policy considerations, make
clear that the "the new keystone to sexual harassment is notice. 7 While
Federal courts take variant approaches to constructive discharge claims,
most examine whether the employer had notice of the harassing working
conditions and whether the employee bypassed available avenues of redress
and instead unreasonably resigned. This dominant approach goes to the
crux of the Court's rationale in Ellerth/Faragher. Moreover, current case
law indicates that in the context of supervisory harassment, a cognizable
constructive discharge often involves a "failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits." 9 This casenote argues that if the Supreme
Court were to resolve the inquiry of whether a constructive discharge is a
tangible employment action in the context of a decision applying this
dominant approach it would answer in the affirmative.
The Court, however, has agreed to answer this question on the facts
and analysis of the Third Circuit's Suders opinion. This choice is
problematic because the Third Circuit's analysis, by essentially
disregarding the dominant approach, lacks the assurance generally present
in constructive discharge cases that the plaintiff-employee's resignation
was truly the result of conduct empowered by the employer. In fact, by
leaving open significant questions as to whether Suders's employer was
5. See Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987) ("When a
constructive discharge is found, an employee's resignation is treated... as if the employer
had actually discharged the employee"). The Supreme Court addressed the concept of
constructive discharge under the National Labor Relations Act (the NLRA) in Sure-Tan v.
N.LR.B., 467 U.S. 883 (1984), where it noted with implicit approval that "[t]he Board, with
the approval of lower courts, has long held that an employer violates [Section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA] not only when, for the purpose of discouraging union activity, it directly dismisses
an employee, but also when it purposefully creates working conditions so intolerable that
the employee has no option but to resign-a so-called 'constructive discharge'." Id. at 894
6. Because the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, though involving distinct parties and
factual circumstances, were issued on the same day and set forth identical holdings this note
will often refer to them in conjunction as one opinion.
7. Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1384 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
8. This casenote deals solely with the situation of constructive discharge culminating
from supervisory harassment, as opposed to coworker harassment, because this is the
question presented to the Court in Suders. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir.
2003).
9. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (explaining that "[a] tangible employment action
constitutes a significant change in employment status" and providing these examples in
addition to "hiring [and] firing").
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implicated in her resignation, the court of appeals' opinion casts doubt on
whether a cognizable constructive discharge has even occurred in Suders's
case. As such, it certainly presents the Court a strange basis for
determining whether a constructive discharge is a tangible employment
action. This dilemma seems certain to be resolved to the detriment of future
plaintiffs if the Court treats the Third Circuit's analysis as the standard
constructive discharge approach. Given that Suders's case presents the risk
of liability being imposed for underlying working conditions that did not
involve a clearly "tangible employment action," it seems unlikely that the
Court would affirm the Third Circuit to deprive the employer of the
affirmative defense.
The Court can certainly solve its "Suders problem" by recognizing
that the case before it, while not explicitly presenting the question of the
appropriate standard governing constructive discharge claims, clearly
illustrates the need for this inquiry's resolution. By seizing Suders as an
opportunity to refine the constructive discharge requirements, so they track
the dominant approach currently utilized by federal courts, the Court could
guarantee that resignations classified as constructive discharges would
genuinely be the functional equivalents of formal discharges. Only by
addressing this predicate issue can the Court resolve the debate surrounding
employer liability for constructive discharge in a manner that will meet its
Ellerth/Faraghergoals, avoid "results [that] would [be] disparate... if not
demonstrably contradictory" and "implement [Title VII] sensibly."'
II. EMPLOYER
VII

LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISORY HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE

A. From Meritor to the Court's Ellerth/Faragher Paradigm:An Emphasis
on Agency Principles and Title VII Concerns in Determining Employer
Liability
Even before enunciating a standard governing employer liability for
supervisory harassment, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
agency law and Title VII considerations in making this inquiry. In its 1996
decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson," the Court, though

acknowledging the presence in lower courts of a "debate over the
appropriate standard for employer liability" 12 declined the party's
"invitation to issue a definitive rule.1 3 Instead, the Court encouraged other
10. Faragher,524 U.S. at 805.
11. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
12. Id. at 72.

13. Id. at 72. The Meritor Court explained that the issue of employer liability had a
"rather abstract quality about it" because the record of the case did not indicate "whether...
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4 while

at the

same time cautioning that "such common-law principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII."' 5 Although, in large part
avoiding the issue, the Meritor Court did, however, flatly reject the court of
appeals conclusion that "employers are always automatically liable for
sexual harassment by their supervisors.' 6
This one imperative was
gleaned from the word "agent" in Title VII's definition of "employer,"
which the Court believed indicated congressional intent to impute agency
principles into the analysis and, thereby, limit employer liability 7
Twelve years later, the Court recognized the inadequacy of its advice
in this area noting that in the wake of its Meritor decision, "Courts of
Appeals ha[d] struggled to derive manageable standards to govem
employer liability for hostile work environment perpetrated by supervisory
employees"' 8 and though "following [its] admonition to find guidance in
the common law of agency ...ha[d] adopted different approaches." ' 9 In
Ellerth/Faragher,the Court squarely addressed the issue, holding that
vicarious liability was the appropriate standard for supervisory hostile work
environment harassment.20 Notably, the Court's new paradigm conditioned
automatic employer liability upon the occurrence of a "tangible
employment action." In cases where "no tangible employment action is
taken," the Court crafted an affirmative defense to liability comprised of
"two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.'
The Court reached its Ellerth/Faragherholding by picking up its
analysis precisely where its discussion in Meritor left off, reaffirming its

[the alleged harasser's] advances were unwelcome, whether they were sufficiently pervasive
to constitute a condition of employment, or whether they were so pervasive and so long
continuing ... that the employer must have become conscious of them." Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The Court "conclude[d] that the Court of Appeals was wrong to entirely
disregard agency principles and impose absolute liability on employers for the acts of their
supervisors, regardless of the circumstances of a particular case." Id. at 73.
17. Id. at 72.
18. Faragher,524 U.S. at 785.
19. Id.
20. Specifically, the Court held that "[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a
victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee." Faragher,524 U.S. at
807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
21. Id. The employer must prove both of these elements by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
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holding that "agency principles are relevant in assigning employer
liability ' 22 under Title VII, and that "an employer is not 'automatically'
liable for [all] harassment by a supervisor. 2 3 Examining the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, the Court decided that the principle embodied in the
"aided in the agency relation" rule,24 which subjected an employer to
liability when an employee is "aided in accomplishing [his tortuous
behavior] by the existence of the agency relation,, 25 provided the
appropriate analysis because supervisors have special "authority conferred
as an element of [their] agency relationship with the employer ' 26 which
"enhanc[es] their capacity to harass., 27 The Court noted, however, that in
the context of supervisory workplace harassment, the "rule requires the
existence of something more than the employment relation itself'28 because
"there is a sense in which a harassing supervisor is always assisted in his
misconduct by the supervisory relationship. '29 A blanket application of the
aided in agency relation principle might thus impose the exact de facto rule
of strict liability that Meritor rejected.3 °

The Court believed that the "authority for requiring active or
affirmative, as distinct from passive or implicit, misuse of supervisory
authority before liability may be imputed ' 3' was best satisfied "when a
supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate. 32
Because "only a supervisor or other person acting with the authority of the

22. Faragher,524 U.S. at 791 ("Meritor's statement of the law is the foundation on
which we build today."). In fact, the Court noted that Meritor's precedential force was
especially enhanced since "Congress has not altered Meritor'srule even though it has made
significant amendments to Title VII in the interim." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
23. Faragher,524 U.S. at 804. See also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 ("[W]e are bound by
our holding in Meritor that agency principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability
in cases of supervisory harassment.").
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957).
25. Id. Restatement section 219 applies only to torts committed outside an employee's
"scope of employment." Id. The Restatement defines conduct the employee is "employed
to perform," occurring "substantially within the authorized time and space limits," and
"actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer]" as within the scope of an
employee's employment. Id. at § 228(1). The Court determined that "sexual harassment by
a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756-57.
See also Faragher,524 U.S. at 794-801.
26. Faragher,524 U.S. at 801.
27. Id. at 800.
28. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742.
29. Faragher,524 U.S. at 802.
30. Id. at 804 ("We are not entitled to recognize [a theory of vicious liability for misuse
of supervisory authority] under Title VII unless we can square it with Meritor's holding that
an employer is not 'automatically' liable for harassment by a supervisor who creates the
requisite degree of discrimination..
31. Faragher,524 U.S. at 804.
32. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
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company can cause933 a "significant change in [a subordinate employee's]
employment status, 3 4 in such circumstances "there is assurance the injury
could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation."35 "For these
reasons, a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for
Title VII purposes the act of the employer,, 36 and the "agency relation
standard... requirements will always be met. 37 The Court concluded that
where a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate results in a
tangible employment action "it would be implausible to interpret agency
principles to allow an employer to escape liability, 38 and thus, no
affirmative defense is available.
At the same time, the Court acknowledged that application of the
agency-relation standard in the context of "supervisor harassment which
does not culminate in a tangible employment action" 39 was a more difficult
determination due to the Restatement's "malleable terminology, which can
be read to either expand or limit liability."4
In order to reconcile its
imposition of vicarious liability with its "holding in Meritor that agency
principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of
supervisory harassment,"'" the Court "recognize[d] an affirmative defense
to liability in some circumstances. 42 Specifically, where a supervisor has
created a hostile work environment, but "no tangible employment action is
taken," 4 an employer may avoid liability by proving it "exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior"" and "that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." 4
By imposing a standard of conditional vicarious liability subject to an
affirmative defense, the Court concluded that it's framework not only
"accommodat[ed] agency principles of vicarious liability for harm caused
by misuse of supervisory authority," but also served Title VII's deterrent
purpose by promoting "the creation of antiharassment policies and effective
grievance procedures '"46 and saving action by objecting employees. 47 The
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 762.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 761-62.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 762-63.
Id. at 763.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
Id.
Id.
Faragher,524 U.S. at 804.
Id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
Id.
Id.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.

2004]

THE SUPREME COURT'S SUDERS PROBLEM

Court reasoned that any theory of vicarious employer liability "would be at
odds with statutory policy 48 if it failed to "encourage employees to report
harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive" while
simultaneously "recogniz[ing] the employer's affirmative obligation to
prevent violations and giv[ing] credit ... to employers who make
reasonable efforts to discharge their duty." 49 Accordingly, the Court
emphasized that it's Ellerth/Faragher holding was not only firmly
grounded in stare decisis, but was also consistent with "Congress' intention
50
to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context.,
B. Questions Left Open After Ellerth/Faragher: What is a Tangible
Employment Action and Does a Constructive Discharge Qualify as a
Tangible Employment Action for Employer Liability Purposes?
Although the Court's new paradigm clarified the limit agency
principles and Title VII considerations impose on employer liability for
supervisory harassment, the broad and sometimes ambiguous language
pervading the Ellerth/Faragheropinions has created division among courts
regarding how an employer can actually avoid liability.'
After
Ellerth/Faragher,the focus of the analysis is certainly on the occurrence of
a "tangible employment action." But, while the presence or absence of
such an action fundamentally affects an employer's level of legal exposure
for supervisory sexual harassment, neither opinion clearly defines its exact
parameters.
The Court's imprecise description of this pivotal term
becomes especially significant and leads to increased complication in the
47. Id. See also Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.

48. Faragher,524 U.S. at 806.
49. Id.
50. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.

51. This is illustrated in recent Federal Court of Appeals cases concerning whether a
tangible employment action requires economic harm. Compare Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of
Tech., 339 F3d. 1158, 1171-73 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A] tangible employment action need not
cause economic harm to the employee ....
), and Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a supervisor's coercing a subordinate employee to perform
sexual demands in return for retaining her job and his failure to terminate the submitting
employee constituted tangible employment actions, despite the non-existence of any
economic harm), with Newton v. Cadwell Lab., 156 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding
that in "the absence of a detrimental employment action," the affirmative defense under
Ellerth and Faragherwas available to the defendant). While this casenote focuses on the
Court's failure to ascribe a precise definition to the term "tangible employment action"
solely as it relates to the inquiry of whether a constructive discharge qualifies, numerous
commentators have discussed the term's uncertainty in other contexts. See, e.g., Susan
Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in Sexual HarassmentAnalysis, 35

U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 809 (Summer 2002); Kelly Collins Woodford & Harry A. Rissetto,
Tangible Employment Action: What Did the Supreme Court Really Mean in Faragher and
Ellerth?. 19 LAB. LAW. 63 (2003).
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context of the fact sensitive constructive discharge inquiry.
The Court, in Ellerth, explained that a tangible employment action
constitutes "a significant change in employment status, 52 giving patent
examples of formal discharge and demotion,53 but failed to indicate
whether constructive discharge qualified; nor did it mention the doctrine
anywhere else in its opinion. 4 The Court's vagueness is further convoluted
by its characterization of a tangible employment action in relation to the
admittedly malleable language of the Restatement. In fact, the Court
conceded that the agency relation standard is a "developing feature of
agency law," and refused to "render a definitive explanation" of its
requirements.55 Nonetheless, the Court simultaneously found that the
tangible employment action is the "something more" necessitated by that
rule in the employer liability context. If by its own terms the Restatement's
agency relation standard is satisfied when a servant is "aided in
accomplishing the tort by existence of the agency relation, 56 then what
does a "tangible employment action" encompass guarantee that
"[w]hatever the exact contours of the aided in the agency relation standard,
its requirements will always be met" 57 when a supervisor takes a tangible
employment action against a subordinate?
The Court's answer seems to lie in the official nature of a tangible
employment action, and its assurance as opposed to mere indication that
whatever injury such an action inflicts could not have been imposed by
someone acting without the company's authority.
So, the Court
emphasizes that a tangible employment action is the "means by which the
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates ' 58 and "requires an official act of the enterprise, a company
act." 59 Beyond representing proof that an additional aid existed to assist the
supervisor in his misconduct, the concept of tangible employment action is
described by the Court in general terms primarily relating to its aftereffects, such as: "in most cases inflicts direct economic harm, "
in most
cases is documented in official company records,' or "may be subject to

52. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
53. Id.
54. The procedural history of Ellerth's case indicates, contrary to the view maintained
by some federal courts, that the district court dismissed Ellerth's constructive discharge
claim and as such, this claim was never squarely before the Court. See Caridad v. Metro
North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999).
55. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957).
57. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

2004]

THE SUPREME COURT'S SUDERS PROBLEM

,,62

review by higher level supervisors.
The Court reasons that a tangible
employment action, whatever its essential attributes, promises employer
empowerment, and thus, when taken by a supervisor becomes "for Title
VII purposes the act of the employer, ' 63 precluding the employer from
asserting the affirmative defense.
The placement of constructive discharge in this already murky
delineation is debated by the federal courts of appeals which draw on
different aspects of the Court's EllerthIFaragherterminology to support
contradictory positions with respect to whether a constructive discharge is a
tangible employment action. 64 As the first federal court of appeals to
address the issue, the Second Circuit, in Caridadv. Metro-North Commuter
R.R., is credited with advancing the position that a constructive discharge
"is not a tangible employment action depriving the employer of the
availability of the affirmative defense to Title VII liability. 66 In its brief
analysis of the issue, the Caridadcourt emphasized the Supreme Court's
intention in EllerthIFaragherto limit employer liability and reasoned that a
constructive discharge did not warrant the imposition of strict liability
because it can 67
be caused by a coworker and is "not ratified or approved by
the employer.,
Since Caridad, however, several federal courts have taken the
contrary view. 68 Explicitly rejecting the Second Circuit's reasoning, the
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Several federal courts of appeals have noted the issue, but expressly declined to rule
on it. See, e.g., Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys. Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding
"no reason to adopt a blanket rule one way or the other"); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson
Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1282 (11 th Cir. 2003) (finding claim of constructive discharge
not properly before the court); Kholer v. Inter-Tel Tech., 244 F.3d 1167, 1179 n.8 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding claim of constructive discharge not properly before the court). Others have
indicated their position in the debate, without squarely deciding one way or the other.
Compare Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., Inc., 97 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2002) (suggesting the
belief that constructive discharge is a tangible employment action), with MallinsonMontague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2000) (indicating agreement with
the Second Circuit).
65. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
66. Id. at 294-95.
67. Id. at 294. The Sixth Circuit has explicitly adopted the Caridadholding. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Dowbrands, Inc., 221 F.3d 1336, tbl.(6th Cir. 2000). Several district courts have
similarly found constructive discharge insufficient to impute automatic employer liability.
See, e.g., Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (D.S.C. 1999); Alberter v.
McDonald's Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (D.Nev. 1999); Desmarteau v. City of
Wichita, Kan., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Kan. 1999); Powell v. Morris, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011,
1019 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
68. See, e.g., Jaros v. Lodgenet Entm't Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2002);
Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2001); Temores v. SG
Cowen, 2003 WL 22455513 (N.D. I11.
Oct. 29, 2003); Vasquez v. Atrium Door & Window
Co. of Arizona, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1142 (D. Ariz. 2002); Haworth v. Romania
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Third Circuit held in Suders that because constructive discharge "operates
as the functional equivalent of an actual termination," and "has, in most
action," 69
critical respects, the primary attributes of a tangible employment
"when proven, [it] constitutes a tangible employment action within the
7°
Even more recently, the Seventh
meaning of Ellerth and Faragher."
Circuit held in Robinson v. Sappington7 1 that "in circumstances where
official actions by the supervisor makes employment intolerable [forcing
the plaintiff to resign] we believe a constructive discharge may be
considered a tangible employment action. 72

III. THE FEDERAL COURTS' DOMINANT APPROACH TO CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE UNDER TITLE VII CONSTITUTES A TANGIBLE EMPLOYMENT
ACTION
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, courts of
appeals universally recognize that a claim of constructive discharge is

cognizable under Title VII. 7 3 The general rule governing constructive
discharge claims is that "the trier of fact must be satisfied that the...
working conditions [are] so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person
in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign., 74 Courts
Imported Motors, Inc., 2001 WL 34041893 (D. Or. 2001); Taylor v. United Regional Health
Care Sys., Inc., 2001 WL 1012803, *6 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F.
Supp. 2d 1160, 1171(N.D. Iowa 2000).
69. Suders, 325 F.3d at 458-60.
70. Id. at 461. See also Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 149 n.5 (3d Cir.
1999) ("[W]here [the plaintiff] was constructively discharged by her supervisors' action
after their own actionable behavior, the holdings and instruction of Ellerth and Faragherare
clear: the employer... is automatically liable and no affirmative defense is available.").
71. 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003).
72. Id. at 336.
73. Title VII makes it unlawful for employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual ... because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2000).
Because Title VII does not literally prohibit employers from coercing an employee into
quitting, but such conduct would certainly violate the statute's intent, courts have developed
the constructive discharge doctrine, which allows a plaintiff who voluntarily quits under
certain circumstances to be treated as having been fired and thus, preserves her right to
equitable remedies. See Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks & Sewer Dep't, 802 F.2d
1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 1986) ("As a general rule, employees are entitled to awards such as
backpay and reinstatement only if they were actually or constructively discharged from their
employment"); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1984).
74. Bourque v. Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980). See also
Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 731 (lst Cir. 1998) ("The question is whether
[plaintiff] presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to credit his claim that a reasonable
employee would have felt compelled to resign under the circumstances."); Drake v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th Cir. 1998) ("To state a claim for
constructive discharge, a plaintiff needs to show that his working conditions were so
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agree that the objective reasonableness of the plaintiff's action of resigning
is central to this inquiry.7 5 Certainly underlying the contrary positions
taken by federal courts over whether a constructive discharge is a tangible
employment action, however, is the "divergence of opinion among the
circuits as' 7 to the findings necessary to apply the [constructive discharge]
doctrine.

1

At the outset, most federal courts assume that in order for a plaintiffs
resignation to be reasonable, the underlying working conditions must, as a

matter of law, meet a minimum threshold of severity or pervasiveness of
intolerability, surpassing that of a hostile work environment. 77 Without
defining this requirement, courts often phrase it as one necessitating
"aggravated factors, 78 and routinely apply it as a benchmark to reject
constructive discharge claims based on situations such as scheduling
conflicts,7 9 negative performance appraisals, ° embarrassment or
humiliation incident to an adverse employment decision,81 or single
incidents of harassment. 82 Even working conditions comprising continuous
intolerable that a reasonable person would have been compelled to resign.").
75. See, e.g., Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985)
("Intolerability of working conditions, as the circuits uniformly recognize, is assessed by the
objective standard of whether a 'reasonable person' in the employee's position would have
felt compelled to resign.").
76. Derr v. Gulf Oil, Co., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Levendos v.
Stem Entm't, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[A]t least two, and possibly three,
different standards have emerged to aid in determining whether constructive discharge has
occurred."). For an in depth discussion of the different standards which apply to
constructive discharge claims under the federal anti-discrimination statutes, see Steven D.
Underwood, Constructive Discharge and the Employer's State of Mind: A Practical
Standard, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 343, 353 (1998); Shelia Finnegan, Constructive
Discharge Under Title VII and the ADEA, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 561 (1986); Martin W.
O'Toole, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge in Title VII Litigation, 71
CORNELL L. REV.587, 589-90 (1986).
77. See, e.g., Sara Kagay, Applying the Ellerth Defense to Constructive Discharge:An
Affirmative Answer 85 IOWA L. REv. 1035, 1048 (2000) (stating that most courts require that
a plaintiff asserting a constructive discharge claim "meet a higher standard of proof than a
plaintiff who seeks merely to prove a hostile working environment"). The Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have all applied, to varying degrees, the
"aggravating factors" requirement in Title VII constructive discharge cases.
78. Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 996 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Proof of discrimination
alone is not a suffici'ent predicate for a finding of constructive discharge; there must be
other 'aggravating factors."'); See also Levendos, 860 F.2d at 1230-31; Watson v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987).
79. See, e.g., Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2001); Brooks v. City of
San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000).
80. Junior v. Texaco, Inc., 688 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1982).
81. See, e.g., Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 1999);
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989); Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 1986).
82. See, e.g., Tutman v. CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 2000).
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discriminatory treatment or deprivation of promotion opportunities may be
found insufficient, in and of themselves, to justify a reasonable employee's
resignation.8' Beyond investigating the intolerability of an employee's
working conditions, numerous courts additionally apply various approaches
examining the employer's role in the plaintiffs resignation. Many courts
employ a requirement resembling the damages theory of mitigation
whereby a plaintiff is expected to seek redress before resigning so as to
provide the "employer... sufficient time to remedy the situation." 84 In
addition, several federal courts mandate the plaintiff present "proof of the
employer's specific intent to force"8 5 a resignation.
The emergence of these divergent standards becomes less significant
when viewed in the totality of the federal courts of appeals' current
constructive discharge jurisprudence. While no formal set of guidelines
dictate the courts' application of the "aggravated factors" element,86 in
order to be cognizable, a constructive discharge claim must accompany a
hostile work environment allegation plus some predicate act, that as a
practical matter, often entails one of the Ellerth Court's examples of a
83. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Meyer's Bakeries Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 497 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that although the plaintiff provided "evidence that [employer] acted in a racially
discriminatory manner" and that work environment was "tinged with discriminatory acts,"
lost promotion opportunity did not create "the overwhelming compulsion to quit that is
necessary for constructive discharge"); Wardwell v. Sch. Bd., 786 F.2d 1554, 1557 (1lth
Cir. 1986) ("[W]hile a discriminatory refusal to promote would be relevant to the issue of
whether [plaintiff] was constructively discharged, such evidence is not always sufficient to
support a finding of constructive discharge."); Heagney v. Univ. of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157,
1166 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[Olther than showing that she was possibly underpaid, [plaintiff] had
not introduced evidence showing circumstances from which it could be inferred that [her
employer] made her employment conditions difficult or intolerable" to justify resignation.);
Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that while "by
no means discount[ing] the discrimination [plaintiff] may have faced," finding unequal pay
did "not constitute such an aggravated situation that a reasonable employee would be forced
to resign").
84. Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc., 93 F.3d 752, 754 (11th Cir. 1996)
("None of the plaintiffs returned to work after complaining to the company's corporate
management. Summary judgment on the constructive discharge claim was appropriate; the
plaintiffs did not allow sufficient time for [their employers] to correct the situation.").
85. Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255 (holding that since, "[a]t most, [plaintiff] demonstrated
that he experienced problems" and a workplace "hardly unbearable for [a reasonable]
employee," he did not show that "anyone impose[d] intolerable working conditions with the
intent to compel him to resign").
86. See Mark S. Kende, Deconstructing Constructive Discharge: The Misapplicationof
Constructive Discharge Standards in Employment Discrimination Remedies, 71 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 39, 78 n.57 (1995) (noting that courts "have not been unanimous on what
constitutes intolerable conditions"); Cathy Shuck, That's It, I Quit: Returning to First
Principles in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J.EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 424
(2002) ("The bottom line is that it is very difficult to tell what 'aggravating circumstances'
need to be present for resignation to be a 'reasonable' response to employer discrimination
and harassment.").
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tangible employment action.
And, although courts couch their
constructive discharge inquiry in terms of the plaintiff's reasonableness,
and articulate differing standards to make this determination, the bottom
line result, beyond imposing a considerable burden on the plaintiff, is that a
legally cognizable constructive discharge reflects assurance that the
employer was implicated in the plaintiff-employee's resignation.
Courts imposing the mitigation requirement and those compelling a
plaintiff to prove an employer's intent to force a resignation demand a
plaintiff show that the employer had notice of, or even contributed to, the
harassing conduct and permitted it to continue, in order to successfully
prove constructive discharge."
To be sure, the Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all either explicitly
required an employee attempt to redress the harassment before resigning,
prove her employer's intent to force resignation, or some combination of
the two requirements. These courts form a dominant approach that
essentially requires proof of employer notice as an element of the
constructive discharge analysis.
As a result of "the pivotal importance notice plays in supervisor sexual
8 9 constructive discharge as
harassment cases [after Ellerth/Faragher],"
applied by a majority of courts has the primary characteristics of a tangible
employment action. In fact, the evidence considered by this approach
necessarily overlaps the evidence highlighted by the Court as relevant in
determining whether the employer should ultimately avoid liability.
Additionally, and arguably more importantly, the rationale underlying this
dominant approach to constructive discharge echoes the Title VII statutory
and policy considerations the Court clearly emphasized as the foundation
of the Ellerth/Faragherdecisions. The consistency of the dominant
approach's objectives and practical outcomes with the Court's

87. See, e.g., Buckley v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 758 F.2d 1252, 1230-31 (1lth Cir. 1985)
(explaining that since the "hospital offered plaintiff a position as staff nurse," a demotion
from her former supervisory position, the "evidence [was] sufficient to create a jury
question as to whether a reasonable person would find these working conditions so
intolerable that she would be forced to resign"); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 138283 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that repeated denials of promotion preventing plaintiff from
access to training and advancement opportunities provided grounds for constructive
discharge); Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that an involuntary transfer of a pregnant employee to heavy manual labor that posed
substantial risks to her health constituted constructive discharge); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d
1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that a "continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment
encompassing deprivation of opportunities for promotion" constituted a sufficiently
aggravated situation where a reasonable employee would resign).
88. See, e.g., Jones, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1384 (involving plaintiffs who "neutralized their
constructive discharge claims" by not notifying their employer of their problems with their
supervisor).
89. Id.
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Ellerth/Faragherframework counsels toward the imposition of strict
employer liability where the plaintiff establishes a cognizable constructive
discharge.
A. THE FEDERAL COURTS "DOMINANT" APPROACH TO CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE

1. Employee Mitigation
Numerous courts of appeals emphasize the importance of an
employee's efforts to alert the employer of a supervisor's harassment and
the relevance of an employer's efforts to prevent and correct that
harassment in determining whether a plaintiff-employee has carried the
burden of proving a constructive discharge. Specifically, these courts
maintain that a reasonable employee has an "obligation not to jump to
conclusions too fast" 90 or "not to assume the worst," 91 and therefore, must

"remain employed while seeking redress, '92 usually through the employer's
grievance procedures, before he or she can assert a successful constructive
discharge claim. As applied, this prerequisite, embraced in some form by
the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, amounts to a quasimitigation requirement, 93 where the "standard of reasonableness...
require[s] the employee who wants to make a successful claim of
constructive discharge to do something before walking off the job." 94
Failure to exhaust this affirmative duty to mitigate is sometimes

90. Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim of constructive discharge because she "did not
give [her employer] an opportunity to demonstrate that it could curb" her alleged harasser's
behavior).
91. Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d 1536, 1539 (lth Cir. 1987) ("[N]ot
reasonable for plaintiff to resign after one day's disappointment [without] realistically
giv[ing her employer] a chance to work her in ... another department or to reassign her to
her old ... position.").
92. Tutman, 209 F.3d at 1050 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d
801, 805 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[A] reasonable employee [who, like plaintiff, was dissatisfied
with his performance evaluation and the withdrawal of some of his responsibilities] instead
of resigning would first have [either] ... completed the internal grievance process, or filed a
complaint with the EEOC."); Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)
("[E]mployee must use 'honest, earnest and intelligent efforts' to mitigate his losses .... ").
93. See, e.g., Shuck, supra note 86, at 426 (describing condition that plaintiffs "not only
remain on the job, but take affirmative steps to mitigate the harm as well" as the
"requirement of mitigation").
94. Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Campos v.
City of Blue Springs, Mo., 289 F.3d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff "must
take affirmative steps short of resigning that a reasonable employee would take to make her
conditions of employment more tolerable" before her quit can be considered a constructive
discharge).
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interpreted as indirectly reflecting on the employee's reasonableness, in
that "passivity in the face of working conditions alleged to be intolerable is
Under this reasoning, "failure
often inconsistent with [that] allegation.
to object to egregious conditions, or to seek some form of redress is
compelling evidence that [the plaintiff], [like] any reasonable worker, [did]
not find the conditions intolerable. 96 More often, federal courts view the
absence of mitigation by the plaintiff employee as unreasonable in itself
due to the deprivation it imposes on the employer, explaining that "[iut is
difficult to find a employee's resignation objectively reasonable and subject
an employer to liability for constructive discharge when the employee quits
without giving her employer a chance to fix the problem., 97 However
articulated, the mitigation requirement mandates that an employee who has
"an avenue of redress within the company and fail[s] to use it"'98 or quits
"without giving the employer a reasonable chance to work out the
problem," 99 can "not prove facts sufficient as a matter of law to constitute
constructive discharge."' °
Federal courts correspondingly find employer response to an
employee's mitigation attempts significant in determining the
reasonableness of that plaintiffs resignation. Where a plaintiff shows that
its employer was aware of the harassment underlying his or her working
conditions and was provided with sufficient time to correct the situation but
nonetheless responded ineffectively, such evidence generally establishes
that the employee was reasonable in feeling compelled to resign. ° To the
95. Lindale, 145 F.3d at 955.
96. Wolf v. Northwest Ind. Symphony Soc'y, 250 F.3d 1136, 1143 (7th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that an employee who "never reported [the] harassment to anyone" and in fact
complimented his boss in his resignation letter was not constructively discharged).
97. Williams v. Kansas City, 223 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding no constructive
discharge where plaintiff "made no attempt to inform her supervisors" of the problem, but
"[r]ather, she abruptly quit"). See also Tidwell, 93 F.3d at 497 (holding that the plaintiff's
"decision to forego any effort at communicating his grievance to [his employer] reinforces
the fact that he acted unreasonably when he quit").
98. Howard v. Bums Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 842 (8th Cir. 1998) (where employee
was "clearly aware of [the grievance] policy" but did not to use it, she "failed to prove that
she was constructively discharged").
99. Coffman v. Tracker Marine, L.P, 141 F.3d 1241, 1247 (8th Cir. 1998) (illustrating
that when a plaintiff "was not an employee who felt she had no place to turn when faced
with unlawful discrimination... [and] knew that she could report any allegations," failure
to mitigate lead to judgment as a matter of law for employer).
100. Id. at 1247. See also Gawley v. Ind. Univ., 276 F.3d 301, 315 (7th Cir. 2001)
(plaintiff not constructively discharged where she waited seven months before availing
herself of the formal procedures the university established for victims of harassment);
Sowell v. Alumina Ceramics, Inc., 251 F.3d 678, 686 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding no
constructive discharge where plaintiff "failed to avail herself of the channels of
communication provided by [employer] to deal with" harassment).
101. See, e.g., Marerro v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 29 (1st Cir. 2002)
(noting that "[g]iven the inadequacy" of the employer's response in the face of "frequent
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contrary, where an employer has taken prompt remedial action to prevent
future harassment this finding "alone is fatal to [a plaintiff's] claim of
constructive discharge.' ' 0 2 For instance, the Seventh Circuit in Saxton v.
AT&T,' °3 found the plaintiff's resignation unreasonable where the employer
"went out of its way to ensure that [she] was not placed
in an
uncomfortable or embarrassing position while the company investigated
the complaint."' 4
Her employer took prompt remedial measures by
allowing her to work at home and offering her a transfer option. In
Buchanan v. Sherrill,'0 5 the Tenth Circuit came to the same result,
determining that "no reasonable person could find that plaintiff had no
choice but to quit" where "defendant had arranged to transfer plaintiff to
another restaurant-thus ending the alleged harassment or discriminationbut she quit her job anyway." 0 6
2. The Employer Intent Requirement
A majority of federal courts of appeals focus their constructive
discharge inquiry "on the impact of an employer's actions, whether
deliberate or not, upon a 'reasonable' employee."'0 7 However, many
circuits scrutinize the employer's motive, holding that in order to prove
constructive discharge, the plaintiff must also show that "the discrimination
complained of amounted to an intentional course of conduct calculated to
force the victim's resignation."' 0 8 This emphasis on deliberateness of the
complaints" it was reasonable for employee to think that "[ilf she wanted to avoid further
harm, she would have to leave work entirely."); Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc.,217
F.3d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the employer's "half-hearted responses to
complaints" and "poorly conducted investigation" established reasonableness of
resignation); Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, (lth Cir. 1993) (finding the plaintiffs
resignation reasonable where she reported harassment to administrators, who took no action
and ignored the alleged harassing supervisor's retaliatory conduct).
102. Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of N. Tex., P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 539-40
(5th Cir. 1998). See also Dornhecker, 828 F.2d at 310 ("Because [employer's] prompt
response was the antithesis of 'inaction,' [plaintff] was not constructively discharged.");
Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 120 n.4 (Ist Cir. 1977) (holding that since
the employer offered the plaintiff a new position, employee's "refusal to accept the transfer
[and instead resign] cannot be considered to be a constructive discharge").
103. 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
104. Id. at 537.
105. 51 F.3d 227 (10th Cir. 1995).
106. Id. at 229.
107. Levendos, 860 F.2d at 1230-31. The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits regularly hold that "no finding of a specific intent on the part of the
employer to bring about a discharge is require[d] for the application of the constructive
discharge doctrine." Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984). See
also Finnegan, supra note 76 (stating that this is the majority view).
108. Goss, 747 F.2d at 887. See, e.g., Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255
(4th Cir. 1985) ("A plaintiff alleging constructive discharge must therefore prove two
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employer's action finds its origin in constructive discharge cases decided
09
under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the NLRA).'
The NLRA consistently requires proof that the employer deliberately made
an employee's working conditions intolerable and forced the employee to
quit because of his union activities.' l° As the earliest court of appeals to
incorporate the constructive discharge concept in a Title VII context, the
Tenth Circuit, in Muller v. U.S. Steel Corp.,"' explicitly relied on the
Board's decisions when recognizing that a constructive discharge claim
requires the plaintiff present "extrinsic evidence to establish that an effort
[so as
had been made to render the job so unattractive
2 and unpleasant...
to] deliberately. . . force him to quit his job.""
As enunciated, this minority approach currently advocated by the
Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits" 3 "requires proof of the
employer's specific intent to force an employee to leave."' 1 4 In practice,
however, these courts acknowledge that "[i]ntent may be inferred through
circumstantial evidence," '"1 5 or by the plaintiffs showing that the
"resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of [his] employers'
discriminatory actions."" 6 While this is arguably a weak intent standard, as
applied by these courts it necessarily entails an inquiry into the employer's
elements: deliberateness of the employer's actions, and intolerability of the working
conditions.").
109. See Kende, supra note 86, at 49 ("The constructive discharge theory was first
developed in National Labor Relations Board cases involving discrimination against union
members."). See also Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1356 (4th Cir. 1995)
("Because we have concluded that the elements of a constructive discharge formulated
under the National Labor Relations Act are equally applicable in the Title VH context, we
require a Title VII plaintiff asserting constructive discharge similarly to prove the
employer's intent to force the plaintiff to quit.").
110. See, e.g., Crystal PrincetonRef. Co., 222 N.L.R.B. at 1069 (noting that constructive
discharge necessitates proof that conditions "imposed upon the employee must cause, and
be intended to cause, a change in [the employee's] working conditions so difficult or
unpleasant as to force him to resign").
111. 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 1975) (no constructive discharge where plaintiff's
"reassignment and the other actions complained of were not designed to coerce his
resignation").
112. Id.
113. See Finnegan, supra note 76, at 562-63 (noting that a minority of circuits have
"imported the NLRA's intent requirement into constructive discharge under Title VII,
requiring the plaintiff to show that the employer intended to force her to quit").
114. Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255-56.
115. Martin, 48 F.3d at 1356. See also Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that "[employer] intended to
force [plaintiff] to quit" where the "evidence showed that [employer's] remedial action
increased the risk of contact between [plaintiff and her harasser]").
116. Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Hoisting & Portable Local No. 101, 3
F.3d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that since alleged harasser "repeatedly propositioned
[plaintiff] ... attempted to force himself on [her] physically" and " threatened to rape her,"
there was "no doubt that [plaintiffs] resignation was a reasonably foreseeable event").
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knowledge of the harassment leading to the plaintiff's resignation
"including [whether the employer] fail[ed] to act in the face of known
intolerable conditions"' 17 or whether the employer urged the plaintiff to
reconsider quitting." 8

In Bergstron-EK, v. Best Oil Co.,"

9

a pregnant

employee who alleged constant harassment by her supervisor received a
reduction in working hours, which was her employer's established "method
of getting an undesirable employee to quit."' 120 Despite the employer's
"knowledge of other pregnant females who complained of [this
supervisor's] discriminatory conduct, no disciplinary action was taken
against [him] .,,121 The Eighth Circuit determined that "it was reasonably
foreseeable to [plaintiffs employer] that [employees] would quit because
of [the supervisor's] discriminatory conduct."'' 22 In effect, under the
employer intent requirement, a plaintiff must show that her "employer,
through action or inaction, render[ed] [her] working conditions so
intolerable that [she] essentially [was] forced to terminate her
employment.' 23
B. Under the Dominant Approach, Constructive DischargeAccommodates
the Court'sEllerth/Faragher Language,Purposes and Objectives
Despite the ambiguity surrounding the concept of a "tangible
employment action" and the need for further clarification of its precise
criteria, the Court's rationale for requiring a tangible employment action,
and the policy behind its Ellerth/Faragher framework generally, is
undoubtedly grounded in agency principles and Title VII objectives. The
Court makes clear that agency principles impose limits on employer
liability unless there "is assurance that [the supervisor's harassment] could
not have been inflicted absent the agency relation.' 24 In circumstances

117. See Martin, 48 F.3d at 1356 (finding "requisite employer intent" from evidence of
assaults and threats of firing and because there was "no evidence that the employer here
took any remedial measures").
118. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[N]o
evidence that [the employer] took ... actions with an intent to force [plaintiff] to quit"
where she was "urged" to reconsider resigning.); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d
633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding no constructive discharge where the evidence showed that
plaintiff's "supervisor sought to persuade her not to quit").
119. 153 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 1998).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Hunt v. State, 297 F.3d 735, 744 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that since plaintiffs
complaints "were not met with any meaningful support, but were instead answered with...
threats of termination, efforts to obstruct their work ... and general harassment" a
reasonable jury could conclude that they were constructively discharged).
124. Ellerth, 514 U.S. at 761-62.
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where there is no such assurance, Title Vil's deterrent purpose and
enforcement policies dictate that both employers and employees have an
46,,125
By emphasizing the
"affirmative obligation to prevent violations.
employee's obligation to seek redress and the employer's duty to avoid
harm, the dominant approach to constructive discharge goes to the heart of
the Court's Ellerth/Faraghermotivations and purpose.
1. Under the Dominant Approach, Constructive Discharge Has the
Essential "Official Action" Attribute of a Tangible Employment
Action
The Court found it "prudent to import the concept [of a tangible
employment action] for resolution of the vicarious liability issue"'126 in
order to accommodate it's Meritor holding that "agency principles
constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory
harassment." 127 The Court explained that a tangible employment action,
which "requires an official [or company] act" 128and is"the means by
which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates,' 2 9 is the appropriate predicate for strict liability because it
"ensure[s] that employer liability would be imposed... only where the
employer is implicated in the harm visited upon the employee by his or her
supervisor." 0 Accordingly, "[w]hat matters [in identifying a tangible
employment action] is the Supreme Court's rationale ...that a supervisor
who takes official action against an employee should be treated as acting
As applied by federal courts which require either
for the employer."''
proof of the employer's intent or of the plaintiffs mitigation efforts, a
constructive discharge that results from intolerable working conditions
created by a supervisor is effectively a "company act" for Ellerth/Faragher

125. Faragher,524 U.S. at 805-06.
126. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Court's statement that "[t]angible employment actions fall within the
special province of the supervisor," Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762, does not mandate that
constructive discharge cannot qualify because it can conceivably be caused by a coworker.
The EllerthlFaragherframework is explicitly only applicable to supervisory harassment
and, thus the concept of a tangible employment action does not even come into play where
working conditions were made intolerable by a coworker. See id. at 764-65; Faragher,524
U.S. at 807.
130. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294. See also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62 ("When a
supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance the injury could not
have been inflicted absent the agency relation.").
131. Reed, 333 F.3d at 33. See also Temores, 2003 WL 22455513 at *5 ("[Tlhe question
is whether the supervisor's abuse of his authority made the adverse action possible.").

836

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 6:3

purposes. 132
Constructive discharge, as applied by most courts, entails a plaintiff
demonstrating that the employer, at the very least, had knowledge of the
conduct leading to the employee's resignation. Pursuant to the duty to
mitigate, a plaintiff must essentially prove that the employer was informed
of the intolerable working conditions and was provided with an opportunity
to redress the harm prior to the employee's resignation. Moreover, a
cognizable constructive discharge claim under the employer intent standard
compels proof that the employer deliberately, through a direct action or
informed inaction, created intolerable conditions with the intention of
forcing an employee to resign.
As a practical matter, if a plaintiff cannot establish that its employer
was at least conscious of his or her intolerable working conditions, the
plaintiff will be unable to fulfill either prerequisite and will be unsuccessful
in the constructive discharge claim. By its nature, a company act is
something the employer has control over and where a constructive
discharge is found under the mitigation or employer intent requirements it
'
is necessarily "empowered by the company."133
Pursuant to these
standards, the constructive discharge that results from intolerable working
conditions created by a supervisor bears "the imprimatur of the
enterprise."' 34 In the appeal of Ellerth's constructive discharge claim to the
Seventh Circuit, Chief Judge Posner intimated that the mitigation standard
embodies the same principle underlying the Court's tangible employment
action. Judge Posner explained in his concurring opinion that Ellerth's
"action in quitting rather than complaining underscores the importance of
agency principles that place appropriate pressure on victims of sexual
harassment to protect themselves... by complaining.1 35
2. The Dominant Approach to Constructive Discharge Incorporates
the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense
There is no question that the Court crafted the EllerthiFaragher
affirmative defense to provide an incentive to employers and employees to
avoid the harm prohibited under Title VII. The Court explained that Title
VII's "primary objective.., is not to provide redress but to avoid harm. 136
132. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
133. Id.
134. Id. One district court recently recognized this point, reasoning that an employer
"should be liable for a constructive discharge if the plaintiff can show that her supervisor
used the authority vested in him by the employer to create working conditions that a
reasonable employee would find to be unbearable." Temores, 2003 WL 22455513 at *6.
135. Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490, 516 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.,
concurring).
136. Faragher,524 U.S. at 806.
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Such a defense "would therefore implement clear statutory policy and
complement the Government's Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize
an employer's affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give credit
here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty."' 37
Under this statutory policy, the Court further clarified, an employee has a
"coordinate duty.., to use such means as are reasonable under the
circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages that result from violations
of the statute."'' 38 The dominant approach to a constructive discharge is
grounded in these same principles of deterrence and avoidance, and largely
incorporates the analysis mandated under the Ellerth/Faragheraffirmative
defense.
Beyond emerging as an aid to assist courts in identifying meritorious
constructive discharge claims, the mitigation requirement, is also often
justified by federal courts on the identical statutory basis underlying the
affirmative defense, that "society and the policies underlying Title VII will
be best served if ... unlawful discrimination is attacked within the context
of existing employment relationships."' 39 Furthermore, the mitigation
requirement effectually mirrors the affirmative defense elements by
examining the employee's attempt to redress the harm and determine
whether the employer promptly responded and pursued reasonable actions
to prevent or correct the harassment. 140 The analysis entailed by this
determination mimics that suggested by Ellerth/Faragherin its emphasis
on whether the employer has antiharassment policies in place and whether
the employee took advantage of the employer's preventative measures. '4'
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Coffinan, 141 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65-66). See also Duncan
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 936 (8th Cir. 2002); Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386,
390 (5th Cir. 1990).
140. Several lower courts and commentators have recognized that the constructive
discharge doctrine as enunciated by Federal Courts of Appeals "is in keeping with" the
affirmative defense. See, e.g., Scott, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 595 ("If an employee could convert a
hostile work environment claim into a constructive discharge claim simply by resigning
without first seeking redress from the employer, then the Ellerth defense would ring
hollow."); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 1999 WL 825275, *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 1999)
(unpublished opinion) (noting that the constructive discharge "reasonableness approach
largely overlaps the second inquiry of the Ellerth defense: whether the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise"). See also Kagay, supra note 77, at 1048
(noting that the mitigation requirement resembles the affirmative defense by "likewise
requir[ing] the employee to reasonably give notice and allow the employer an opportunity to
prevent or correct" the harassment); Shuck, supra note 86, at 444 ("In the case of
constructive discharge, the Ellerth inquiry duplicates the mitigation requirement.").
141. In fact, the EEOC's guidelines regarding constructive discharge under Title VII
emphasize, "an important factor to consider is whether the employer had an effective
internal grievance procedure" and that "an employee's failure to utilize effective grievance
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Where the mitigation standard is met, the plaintiff will not have failed to
"use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or
minimize the damages"' 42 and the employer will not have reasonably
responded to the harassment. 143 Accordingly, application of the mitigation
requirement results in the exact outcome directed by the Court, that "if the
victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be found against the
employer who had taken reasonable care, and if damages could reasonably
have been mitigated no award against a liable employer should reward a
44
plaintiff for what her own efforts could have avoided."'
A comparable result arises in jurisdictions requiring a plaintiff to
prove "specific intent" on the part of the employer. Under these courts'
decisions, where the standard is fulfilled, employers generally either had
"recognized practice[s] ... [used] to force unwanted employees to quit"' 45
or possessed knowledge of the harassment and permitted it to continue or
failed to respond in a way that was "reasonably calculated to end the
intolerable working environment."' 146
Additionally, in applying the
employer intent requirement, courts recognize that an employer's
"reasonably calculated response"' 147 may "negate any reasonable inference
of intent.",14 8 Thus, an employee cannot successfully claim constructive
discharge if an employer has remedied the harassment and the employee
nonetheless resigns. 149 In these jurisdictions, if a plaintiff successfully

procedures... may defeat a claim of constructive discharge." Policy Guidance on Current
Issues of Sexual Harassment, 1999 WL 1104701, * 12-* 14 (E.E.O.C. Guidance).
142. Faragher,524 U.S. at 806.
143. See, e.g., Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 574 (8th Cir. 1997)
(finding that a reasonable jury could find constructive discharge where plaintiff attempted to
use employer's "open door policy and complained to several members of management on
different occasions about the harassment ...but management generally ignored those
complaints"). See also Shuck, supra note 86, at 444 ("[I]f the plaintiff satisfies the
mitigation requirement for constructive discharge, then the employee has not failed to avail
herself of remedies available in her employment, and the employer's response was not
effective.").
144. Faragher,524 U.S. at 806.
145. Chertkova, 92 F.3d at 90. See, e.g., Bergstrom-EK, 153 F.3d at 859; Moore v. Kuka
Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999).
146. Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1133 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding that "the investigation [the employer] claims to have undertaken was cursory and
failed to end the harassment ...it fell far short of the types of responses courts have held
adequate"). See also Henderson, 217 F.3d at 617.
147. Aminnokri, 60 F.3d at 1133.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
plaintiff failed to prove deliberate employer action to force her resignation, where "[it [was]
uncontested that once [employer's] officials were made aware of [her] complaints, they
immediately began an investigation" and offered to transfer her, per her request, but plaintiff
"simply refused the transfer and failed to return to work"); Matvia v. Bald Head Island
Mgmt. Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding no deliberateness on the part of
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claims constructive discharge, an employer will be unable to prove that it
"exercised reasonable care to prevent or correct promptly any harassing
behavior."'"5 Moreover, the employer will be unable to prove that "the
plaintiff employee failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities"'' and thereby fail to fulfill the affirmative defense.
3. Under the Dominant Approach, a Uniform Rule that Constructive
Discharge Qualifies As a Tangible Employment Action Will Lead to
the Appropriate Outcome under Ellerth/Faragher
Several recent decisions by federal courts of appeals employing the
dominant approach to constructive discharge in claims involving employer
liability reveal the overlap of these inquiries. These decisions also
demonstrate the conditions under which plaintiff-employees will prevail in
claiming constructive discharge are analogous to those that compel
imposition of employer liability pursuant to Ellerth/Faragher.152
Take the Seventh Circuit's recent decision and reasoning in Robinson.
Robinson, a judicial clerk, alleged her supervisor, Judge Sappington,
sexually harassed her by making overtly sexual comments and
inappropriately monitoring her outside activities and personal life. She
claimed that her resultant resignation constituted a constructive
discharge.153 After finding a "reasonable person would conclude that these
actions created an objectively hostile work environment,"1 5 4 the court
addressed Robinson's constructive discharge claim. Recognizing that
"working conditions for constructive discharge must be even more
egregious than the high standard for hostile work environment,"1' 5 the court
found that Judge Sapington's conduct was "hostile and intimidating and...
56
would interfere with the work performance of a reasonable person.'
Reiterating the Seventh Circuit's mitigation standard that "an employee is

the employer where "the record is replete with instances of management's attempts to
persuade co-workers to be civil towards [plaintiff]").
150. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.
151.

Id.

152. See, e.g., Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1999)
(observing the overlap in proof when determining that the plaintiff was constructively
discharged for "essentially the same reasons that [the court] conclude[d] that [she] suffered
[an] adverse employment action"); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 1999 WL 825275, *6 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 21, 1999) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a constructive discharge for
"much of [the] reasoning [which] applies equally to the court's finding that [the employer]
has established the two elements of the affirmative defense").
153. Id. at 320-23.
154. Id. at331.
155. Id. at 334.
156. Id. at 331.
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expected to remain employed while seeking redress," 157 the court noted that
Robinson took "formal steps to curb Judge Sappington's behavior"15' by
reporting her harassment to the county's circuit court presiding judge,
Judge Greanias. Despite attempts to rectify her working conditions, there
was "evidence in the record ... that Judge Sappington had no intention of

ceasing his harassment.' 15' Furthermore, the Court found that while Judge
Greanias offered Robinson a transfer in response to her harassment, he
simultaneously acknowledged that this alternative position "would be hell"
and "indicated that it was in [her] best interest to resign."' 6 ° The court
concluded that Robinson "was entitled to take Judge Greanias at his
word"'16' and that it was reasonable for her to credit his suggestion that she
resign.
In addition to finding that "the jury could conclude that Ms. Robinson
suffered a constructive discharge,"' 162 the court determined that her transfer
"was only possible because Judge Greanias had been empowered by the
employer to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his
control"'163 and that "Judge Greanias was speaking in his official,
supervisory capacity"' 64 when suggesting she resign. Accordingly, the
court held that because Robinson demonstrated that "official actions by
[her supervisors] ma[de] [her] employment intolerable,"'165
her
"constructive discharge may be considered a tangible employment
action.' 66 Determining "it would be appropriate to hold the [employer]
liable for Ms. Robinson's resulting resignation,"' 167 the Robinson court
"conclude[d] that the EllerthIFaragherdefense is not available in the
present case"'' 68 and "therefore [it did not need to] reach the issue of
whether [plaintiffs] transfer... standing alone also constituted a tangible
employment action."' 69
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Jackson v. Arkansas Department of
Education 70 conversely illustrates that where the dominant approach to the
constructive discharge standard is not met the employer will most likely be
successful in fulfilling the requirements of the affirmative defense. The
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
272 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2001).
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Jackson court addressed the plaintiff's supervisory hostile work
environment and constructive discharge claims and determined that "the
[employer] was entitled to the [Ellerthi/Faragheraffirmative defense"''
with regards to the former claim because it "acted promptly and effectively
to remedy the past sexual harassment. ,17' The court further found that
Jackson "unreasonably failed to take advantage of [her employer's]
preventative or corrective opportunities through her failure to report the
harassment for more than nine months ...and her refusal to participate"' 73

in a meeting with her employer. In applying the Eighth Circuit's mitigation
and intent standards, the Jackson court duplicated this analysis using the
"constructive discharge terminology" to find that Jackson's "working
conditions were not so intolerable that she was forced to resign.' 74 The
court explained that because Jackson "did not notify [her employer] until
nine months after.., and because she refused to participate in ...formal
sexual harassment correction procedure,"' 7 5 she "did not provide [her
' 76
employer] with a reasonable opportunity to correct the alleged problem.'
The Jackson court also found the defending employer "did reasonably
correct the problem ...by changing [the alleged harasser's] schedule...
and ultimately firing [him].' 77 Concluding its constructive discharge
analysis as it had its Ellerth/Faragherapplication to Jackson's hostile work
environment claim, the
court held that the employer was "entitled to the
178
affirmative defense.'
IV. THE SUDERS PROBLEM

A legally cognizable constructive discharge will generally entail one
of the Court's examples of a "tangible employment action.' 79 By applying
the dominant approach, federal courts essentially compensate for the
malleability of the reasonableness standard and the uniqueness of every
plaintiff's working conditions by mandating that the employer was made
aware of the underlying harassment through some employee action and
took an appropriate response to correct the situation. Due to the absence of
171. Id. at 1026.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1027.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., supra note 83. The Court also indicated that a "bruised ego," "demotion
without change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige" and an inconvenient job reassignment
were insufficient to qualify as tangible employment actions. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
Cognizable constructive discharge claims often embody this characterization as well. See,
e.g., supra notes 79-82.
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a uniform constructive discharge standard, however, a court is free to
deviate from the dominant approach and formulate its own benchmark. It
is in this circumstance that the possibility exists for a plaintiff's resignation
to be found reasonable, so as to support a constructive discharge, where the
resignation was in response to predicate actions that, while certainly
actionable harassment, were not assuredly empowered by the employer.
The Suders case is an example of such a situation.
Suders's claim primarily involved allegations that would uniformly be
characterized as working conditions constituting a hostile work
environment. 8 However, Suders also alleged that she was "set... up on a
false theft charge,"'18' which was the "last straw"' 8 2 leading to her
resignation. The events leading up to this incident were set in motion when
Suders came to believe that her supervisors "lied to her about the [required
computer] test results and that they never sent her test scores to [the
department in charge of officer education] because she found her exams in
a set of drawers in the women's locker room. 1 83 Upon realizing that
Suders's test results were missing, officers dusted the drawers with a theft
detection device that turns the suspected thief s hands blue. 84 When
Suders attempted to return the test, a group of officers "treated her as they
would an accused suspect."'' 85 Suders was immediately "handcuffed,
photographed, and questioned' 8 6 and told that she was a "suspect.' 87 She
was taken into an interrogation room, where Sergeant Easton, her
supervisor and alleged harasser, "advised... of her Miranda rights"' 88 and
"detained [her] for further questioning."' 89 She was released only upon
"reiterat[ing] [to Easton] her intent to resign." '90 Although she had
previously prepared a resignation letter, "[a]rguably, Suders made only one
serious attempt.., to resolve her problems within the remedial program
establish by the PA State Police"' 9' and there was also evidence that "[n]o

180. Suders alleged that she "suffered mistreatment and sexual harassment" at the hands
of three supervisors, one sergeant and two corporals, which included "several instances of
name-calling, repeated episodes of explicit sexual gesturing, obscene and offensive sexual
conversation, and the posting of vulgar images." Suders, 325 F.3d at 436.
181. Id. at447.
182. Id. at 439.
183. Id. at 439. The Third Circuit recognized that the issue of who had access to the
drawers was disputed. Id.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.

189. Id.
190. Id.
191.

Id. at446.
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attempt was made to follow up on Suders's initial"' 92 complaint by either
her employer's Equal Employment Opportunity Officer.
When examining whether Suders alleged a cognizable constructive
discharge claim, the Third Circuit emphasized that this incident removed
"[a]ny shred of doubt"' 193 over whether the alleged harassment was
sufficiently intolerable that a reasonable person in Suders's position would
have felt compelled to resign. In making this determination, the Suders
court essentially disregarded the dominant approach. The court outright
"reject[ed] the imposition of an aggravated circumstances requirement
often imposed by other Courts of Appeals,"' 94 and although expressing
doubt over whether Suders sufficiently mitigated her harm so as to provide
her employer a chance to effectively respond,' 95 decided that mitigation
"does not amount to a quasi exhaustion requirement." 196 It instead urged
that the facts "be considered in light of thc totality of the circumstances.'

97

Under the dominant approach, a federal court would have examined
Suders's attempt to redress her harm as it related to her constructive
discharge claim, but the Suders court evaded this issue by concluding,
"false charges of misconduct are tantamount to threats or suggestions of
discharge."1 98 While there may be instances where a threat of discharge is
a sufficient basis for finding an employee's resignation a constructive
discharge, the Third Circuit's departure from the dominant approach
undermines its conclusion that Suders's claim is such a case. In essence, it
begs the question of whether Suders involves a constructive discharge that
would be cognizable in any other jurisdiction. 199 For the same reasons, the

192. Id. at 443.
193. Id. at 446.
194. Id. at 444.
195. The Suders court implied that without the evidence of Suders being set up on false
charges of theft, issues of fact remained regarding whether her "one serious attempt... to
resolve her problems within [her employer's remedial program] qualified as adequate
mitigation providing her employer a chance to remedy the problems" but held the district
court erred in granting summary judgment because it was "plausible that a jury would
conclude that Suders" was constructively discharged. Id. at 447.
196. Id. at 445.
197. Id. at 445.
198. Id. at 447. The Suders court explained that, in its view, "[aittacking someone with a
false charge of theft seems a most effective way of suggesting that an employee will be fired
or should leave voluntarily." Id. at 446.
199. Employing the dominant approach, several federal courts have found cognizable
constructive discharge claims where the underlying working conditions involved threats of
discharge. See, e.g., Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that since
plaintiff experienced "pervasive, unabated harassment by his supervisors," including
retaliatory conduct for filing a complaint and being told his "days are numbered" there was
"sufficient evidence to allow reasonable fact-finder to conclude that a reasonable person in
[his] position would have felt compelled to terminate his employment"); EEOC v. Univ. of
Chicago Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 331-32 (7th Cir. 2002) ("When an employer acts in a manner
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Suders court's analysis and assessment of the evidence leaves it unclear
whether Suders resignation, preceded by a "threat of discharge," was
assuredly made possible by her supervisor's official empowerment.
The Supreme Court does not specifically address whether a threat of
discharge leading to a resignation should be considered the type of action
that is empowered by the employer in either Ellerth or Faragher. The
Court's description of a tangible employment action and its treatment of
Ellerth's case may evince an intent to preclude mere threats .20
The
question, though, is whether it is clear that a supervisory threat of
termination, when part of other evidence found sufficient to prompt an
employee reasonably to resign, should be considered a fulfilled threat that
necessarily carries the "imprimatur of the enterprise."
Judge Posner's
concurring decision in Ellerth's case before the Seventh Circuit addresses
the issue more directly. He observed that "when the supervisor merely
makes threats... but does not carry [them] out... he has not used his
delegated authority to commit a company act."2 0 ' But "[t]he difficult
borderline case is that of constructive termination precipitated by a
threat, ' 20 2 where though the resignation may "look to the supervisor's
superior like a voluntary quit... there is always some paperwork
involved ' 203 and "higher-ups in the company will have some ability to
monitor constructive discharges. ' 2°
Suders falls exactly within this thorny category. The Third Circuit
avoids dealing with the factual issues pervading Suders claim by
concluding that because the "circumstances of the allegedly false charge of
theft are quite likely detailed in documents ' 205 and "surely [left] a paper
trail," 2° Suders resignation was "ratified by the employer. 2 7 While the
Court in Ellerth recognized that a tangible employment action is "in most

so as to have communicated to a reasonable employee that she will be terminated, and the
plaintiff employee resigns, the employer's conduct may amount to constructive discharge").
200. In Ellerth, the Court framed the issue before it as "whether an employer has
vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work environment by making explicit
threats... but does not fulfill the threat." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753. In applying its holding
to Ellerth's case, the Court's language is open to interpretation. The Court stated that she
did "not allege she suffered a tangible employment action" and that, "Burlington should
have an opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative defense to liability." Id. at 766.
Nonetheless, the Court also noted that "[o]n remand, the District Court will have the
opportunity to decide whether it would be appropriate to allow Ellerth to amend her
pleading." Id.
201. Ellerth, 123 F.3d at 513 (Posner, C.J., concurring).
202. Id. at515.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Suders, 325 F.3d at 460.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 459.
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cases ... documented in official company records, 2 °8 without application
of the dominant approach, it is unclear whether this is sufficient to establish
an "official act of the enterprise" in Suders's case.
Simply stated, the Supreme Court's Suders problem is that the Suders
opinion raises numerous significant questions, rendering it an inappropriate
vehicle to decide the question actually before the court; whether a
constructive discharge is a tangible employment action. The Robinson
court's analysis exemplifies that a supervisory threat of discharge may be
empowered by the employer and thus an appropriate basis for finding
constructive discharge. However, the Suders court's discussion leaves no
such assurance. Accordingly, Title VII's policy and enforcement efforts to
provide employers with incentives to avoid harm counsel that the employer
should be provided the opportunity to satisfy the affirmative defense. 2°9
V. CONCLUSION

Under the dominant approach, a constructive discharge should be, as
the Third Circuit suggests, the "functional equivalent of a formal
discharge, 21 ° where the employer is implicated in the plaintiff's
"significant change in employment status. ' 2" In such circumstances, a per
se rule that a constructive discharge is a tangible employment action
appropriately accommodates the Court's Ellerth/Faragherpolicy concerns
and rationale. In most cases, such a holding will result in a uniform proper
result. The employer will be held automatically liable for only those
resignations that are assuredly the result of conduct by the supervisor, made
possible through the "imprimatur of the enterprise" and thus, suitably
considered "for Title VII purposes the act of the employer." But, the
Suders decision makes it impossible to reach this conclusion by leaving
significant factual issues regarding whether Suders's resignation, resulting
from a "threat of discharge," was a "company act."
The concern, that equating a constructive discharge with other types of
tangible employment actions will impose liability on the employer any time
a plaintiff resigns is only viable where a federal court departs from the
stringent burden the dominant approach places on employees alleging
constructive discharge. In other words, the anxiety on the part of
employers, courts, and commentators that strict liability will be imposed

208. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
209. See Kagay, supra note 77, at 1052 (arguing that if "constructive discharge arises
from a hostile work environment, in which a supervisor harasses an employee but makes no
significant change in the employee's status ... [t]hat type of claim ... should allow the
employer an affirmative defense").
210. Suders, 325 F.3d at 446.
211. Ellerth. 524 U.S. at 761.
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inappropriately is truly a concern about the requirements of constructive
discharge. Consider the Second Circuit's Caridaddecision in light of its
consistent application of the employer intent requirement in its constructive
discharge analysis. 212 Under the facts of Caridad's claim, "[d]espite [her
employer's] sexual harassment policy and the availability of procedures for
lodging complaints, 213 she "failed to report [her] harassment '214 and
"declined [her employer's offered] transfer., 21 5 It seems unlikely that the
Second Circuit would have found the employer intent standard met.
However, the Caridad court skipped over analyzing whether Caridad's
claim involved a true constructive discharge and went straight to the
Ellerth/Faragheremployer liability analysis, emphasizing that "Caridad
did not complain of the harassment prior to quitting her job"21 6 and that
"constructive discharge is not ratified or approved by the employer. 2 7 In
actuality, the Second Circuit's constructive discharge jurisprudence
suggests that Caridad failed to state a constructive discharge claim and so
the court, while reaching the same outcome, arguably approached the issue
backwards.
The Suders court analysis, in fact, manifests this tension by finding the
working conditions underlying Suders's resignation to "surpass a threshold
of intolerable conditions" so as to be sufficient to establish constructive
discharge despite the absence of any "assurance [that] the injury could not
have been inflicted absent the agency relation. 2 8 At its core, the Suders
court's analysis and conclusion illustrate that a rule regarding whether
constructive discharge is a tangible employment action can only be
effective and avoid inconsistency in judgments once the Court enunciates a
concise and uniform standard to govern constructive discharge claims. If
presented to the Court as involving a cognizable constructive discharge,
Suders's claim appears insufficient to impose automatic employer liability
under Ellerth/Faragher.

212. See, e.g., Terry, 336 F.3d at 151-52; Chertkova, 92 F.3d at 90; Martin v. Citibank,
N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Shuck, supra note 86, at 444 (noting that
the "holding in the Second and Fourth Circuits that a constructive discharge does not
constitute a tangible employment action are particularly perverse, considering that these
circuits follow the specific intent rule").
213. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 290-93.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 294.
217. Id.
218. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753.

